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Abstract 
Providing regional and global security governance is both increasingly common and controversial in 
Germany. The paper addresses the sources of current controversies in three areas: First, legal limits 
that emanate from the delegation of competences in regional and international institutions. Secondly, 
financial limits which have become even more prevalent since the inception of the Euro-Crisis. And 
thirdly, political limits which refer to the erosion of the cross-partisan consensus in German coalition 
governments that the country must play a prominent, if not a leadership role in European security 
governance and beyond. 
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1. Introduction 
Post World War II German foreign and security policy is commonly understood to be history bound, a 
policy devoid of unilateralism, ideological zeal and militarism. Thus, a world of ’interconnected 
interests’ and ’international division of labor’ arises with Germany being the poster child of regional 
and global security governance. But, imagine a world in which Germany’s international role changes, 
a world in which Germany’s more recent happy past becomes more important for today’s conduct in 
foreign affairs. What kind of policy pattern would we expect? 
Drawing on role theory, I offer an interpretation that begins with the central role of transatlantic 
(NATO) and European integration (EU) in Germany’s approach to international security governance. 
The chapter first develops a synthetic understanding of regional and global security governance that is 
then applied to Germany. I argue that Germany’s role in security governance has substantially 
changed since unification because the composition of Germany’s role, i.e. the relative importance of 
ego and alter expectations has shifted. I propose that while Germany’s contribution to regional and 
global security governance remains substantial and robust, recent historical experience and shifting 
domestic currents have transformed its conduct.  
This conceptualization of Germany’s international role differs from both recent realist 
interpretations that detect a power-based drift towards an independent and unilateralist foreign policy 
(Hyde-Price 2003; Hellmann 2004, 2011; Crawford 2007) and more historical institutionalist 
interpretations which stress Germany’s continued multilateral embeddeness (Bulmer/Paterson 2013; 
Kirchner 2010; Miskimmon 2007; Paterson 2011). It does so by identifying the mechanisms by which 
the domestic expectations towards Germany’s role have changed: the experience and prevailing 
expectation of living in peace with its neighbors, legal consideration stemming from sovereignty 
losses in international institutions, financial consideration emanating from post-unification and Euro 
zone concerns and political deliberations arising from Germany’s complex coalition arithmetics. 
To explore Germany’s take on of regional and global security governance more specifically, I 
define governance broadly as “the exercise of authority by an actor over some limited community” 
and operationalize Germany’s contribution to the regional and global level by analyzing data in four 
areas of security governance production: assurance, prevention, protection and compellence (cf. 
introduction). In addition, the paper addresses Germany’s attempts to facilitate regional security and 
global governance by supporting emerging powers to take up greater responsibilities and to integrate 
into existing institutions rather than establishing new ones. 
This outline of the argument is followed by a brief description of Germany’s security policy 
trajectory since unification. The chapter will then identify key developments in its regional and global 
security governance production. Thereafter, it focusses upon Germany’s policy towards emerging 
regional actors before concluding with a brief theoretical reflection upon causal/constitutive forces 
driving role change. 
2. Germany’s post-unification security policy trajectory 
During the cold war, Germany’s security governance imprint was limited. While each of the 
superpowers organized its alliance system to balance or roll back the other, Germany’s security 
functions as a delployment area for NATO forces and the major continental troop supplier remained 
stable. Throughout this period, it would not deploy armed forces in hostilities and refrain from 
producing, holding or deploying non-conventional weapons on German soil. 
In the 1990s, facing various foreign expectations to further integrate and choke up a more 
pronounced security posture, unified Germany engaged in various and ever more robust military 
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interventions. While some pundits found that this constituted a ’normalization’ and a clear break with 
Germany’s established ’culture of reticence’ in military affairs (Baumann /Hellmann 2001; Wagener 
2006), others criticized a lack of material military commitment consistent with Germany’s pioneering 
role in establishing CFSP and ESDP (Wagner 2005; Miskimmon 2007). 
After unification, Germany’s military deployment patterns never fully embraced the external 
expectations, especially those of the United States. First, after a long and arduous debate the Federal 
Constitutional Court ruled that the Bundestag would have to give its prior consent to any foreign 
deployment of armed troops; Secondly, in all of its deployment – except for the retroactive 
legitimization of the Kosovo intervention – Germany insisted upon a prior decision by the UN 
Security Council. Thirdly, German force planning, including the perpetuation of the draft, was such 
that one of the biggest armies in Europe could not deploy more than 10.000 soldiers at any one time, 
thereby seriously limiting the German contribution to any major international mission.  
Thus, even before the much criticized Iraq decision not to deploy any troops in support of the US-
led intervention, peculiarities were evident. Germany took a leadership role in establishing the ESDP, 
calling for autonomous EU military capabilities, thereby balancing its traditional transatlantic 
commitment with a growing preference for a ‘European approach’, featuring multilateralism, 
preventive strategies and non-military means. At the same time, transatlantic cooperation for example 
in Afghanistan, at the horn of Africa or in the diplomatic struggle to contain the Iranian nuclear 
program remained the key pillar of Germany’s security outlook (Keller 2012). 
More recently, having decided not to vote in favor of limited military strikes against the Gaddafi 
regime in Libya in the UN Security, and having taken a very sceptical view towards external military 
intervention in the Syrian civil war, the Christian-liberal coalition government of Angela Merkel has 
raised serious concerns both externally and domestically. To some observers, these decisions signal 
that Berlin out of domestic considerations has shed or is about to shed its traditional role as a 
dependable ally of the United States, the UK and France (Stahl 2012; Lindström/Zetterlund 2012: 30). 
In sum, however, while changing some of its military deployment trajectory, Germany held fast to 
a role concept that still features important differences from other major European powers. 
3. Germany’s support for regional and global security governance 
To assess Germany’s support for security governance and identify changes to its role conception, the 
paper will focus on the four main security governance production modes introduced by Kirchner and 
Sperling (2010). To be sure, there is considerable debate over whether Germany is doing its fair share 
in NATO or honoring its own long-standing pro-integrationist rhetoric with regard to ESDP 
(Hellams/Schreer 2012; Kirchner 2010; Overhaus 2009; Wagner 2005). Opinions vary depending on 
what kind of normative yardstick is applied, so that this debate is hard to resolve. It therefore seems 
plausible to focus on the pattern and evolution of Germany’s security governance approach across a 
wide range of issue areas. To do so attention will be devoted to Germany’s engagement in assurance 
missions first. 
3.1 Assurance  
Observing absolute and relative deployment shares in international security governance missions and 
analyzing the regional distribution of forces, the following pattern for Germany becomes visible: On 
the one hand, Germany contributes substantial forces to both EU and UN missions which (fairly 
closely) resemble its demographic share and economic weight in the respective organization. On the 
other hand, Germany’s geographic force projection pattern revealed a strong European bias in the 
1990s and early 2000s but this has changed since then. 
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More specifically, some 8120 German police forces participated since 1990 in more than 25 
missions. 
Table 1: German Police mission in various international organizations, 1990-2012 
WEU EU UN OSCE Bilateral 
WEUPOL Mostar 
– Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
EU AMIS – 
Darfur 
region/Sudan 
MINURSO – 
Sahara region 
 
OSCE Croatia GPPT – 
Afghanistan 
WEU Danube – 
FY 
EUPOL 
PROXIMA – 
Macedonia 
UNTAG – 
Namibia 
 
OSCE PMG / 
Croatia 
 
MAPE – Albania EUPAT – 
Macedonia 
UNTAC – 
Cambodia 
  
  UNOMIG – 
Georgien 
  
  UNMIS – Sudan.   
     
Ongoing Missions     
 EUMM – Georgia UNMIL – Liberia   
 EUPOL AFG – 
Afghanistan 
 
UNAMID – 
Darfur 
region/Sudan 
 
  
 EUPOL COPPS – 
Palestine 
Authority 
UNMISS – South 
Sudan 
  
 EULEX Kosovo – 
Kosovo 
UNMIK – Kosovo   
 EUBAM – 
Ukraine/Moldava 
   
 EUBAM Rafah – 
Israel/PA 
   
 EUPM – Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
   
Data: ZIF 2008; ZIF 2013. 
A more differentiated pattern emerges when comparing civilian and military deployment (in man-
years for the period 2004-2006 and 2002-2006 respectively) with Gross National Income (GNI) 
shares. As Kirchner has found, Germany ranges at the bottom of all EU members in the civilian realm 
while it figures slightly above the average when it comes to military contributions (Kirchner 2010: 
146-147). Interestingly, Germany’s military contribution is higher in Europe while France’s is bigger 
than that of any other major EU member in Africa. 
As shown in Table 2, when looking at EU missions, there is no clear-cut pattern of evolution across 
the missions: some German participation expands, some decreases and no overall fixed German 
relative average participation rate percentage seems to be set. 
  
Sebastian Harnisch 
4 
Table 2: German contribution to EU-led assurance missions 2003-2007  
Mission 
German Contribution by year 
(Number / % of mission total) 
Aver. 
year- 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Span 
EU Proxima 
(Macedonia) 
 
25 
(15.5%) 
21 
(14.9%) 
  15.2% 
EUJUST Themis 
(Georgia) 
 N/A N/A    
EUPAT 
(Macedonia) 
  
4 
(13.8%) 
4 
(12.5%) 
 13.2% 
AMM 
(Aceh) 
  
9  
(7.6%) 
4 
(14.8%) 
 11.2% 
EU support to AMIS II 
(Darfur) 
  
5 
(17.9%) 
6 
(22.2%) 
6  
(12%) 
17.4% 
EUPM 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina) 
85 
(18.1%) 
 
29 
(15.4%) 
19 
(11.4%) 
23 
(12.9%) 
15% 
EUSEC  
(DR Congo) 
   
1  
(3.1%) 
1  
(2.6%) 
2.9% 
EUJUST LEX 
(Iraq) 
  
1  
(8.3%) 
1  
(4.5%) 
1  
(5%) 
5.9% 
PAMECA 
(Albania) 
  
4  
(25%) 
 
3  
(20%) 
22.5% 
EU BAM 
(Rafah) 
  
6  
(8.5%) 
5  
(7%) 
4  
(5.1%) 
6.9% 
EUSR 
(Georgia) 
   
1 
(11.1%) 
1  
(10%) 
10.6% 
EU Border Assistance 
(Moldova/ 
Ukraine) 
    
7  
(10%) 
 
EUPT  
(Kosovo) 
   
3 
(10.3%) 
5 (13.9%) 12.1% 
EUPOL 
(Kinshasa) 
  N/A N/A N/A  
EUPOL  
(Congo) 
    N/A  
EUPOL COPPS 
(Palestinian Territories) 
   N/A N/A  
EUPOL 
(Afghanistan) 
    N/A  
Data: SIPRI Database 2004-2007, Council of the EU 2008)
1
 
In sum, these findings suggest that Germany pursues a robust assurance posture that does not support 
the claim that Germany is free-riding when it comes to assurance. Rather, the record shows that the 
evolution of Germany’s role was robust in terms of absolute and relative numbers, geographical 
distribution and mission reliability, i.e. keeping a steady number of forces to get the job done. 
                                                     
1
 The table does not include EULEX Kosovo, which was launched in 2008. Additional sources are Missiroli 2003; 
information from mission websites and reports 2005, 2007, 2008, 2009; information received from the General 
Secretariat of the Council of the EU, 2005, 2006, 2007; information received from the Chief of Press and Public 
Information Office, AMM, 2006, 2007; information received from EUFOR ALTHEA Spokesperson, 2006; information 
received from Deputy Press and Public Information Officer, EU BAM Rafah, 2007. 
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3.2 Prevention 
Assessing Germany’s prevention policy trajectory requires accounting for a broad variety of different 
policies, ranging from development assistance to post-conflict state-building activities and migration 
policy. Traditionally, Germany’s role as a ‘civilian power’ under US tutelage involved that its 
‘military culture of restraint’ would be matched by a ‘pro-active culture of prevention’ 
(Fincke/Hatakoy 2004). And indeed, under the Red-Green coalition (1998-2003), we find that 
Germany developed a comprehensive concept for conflict prevention to be implemented through 
national, European and other fora. In 2004, it devised a national ‘Action Plan on Civilian Conflict 
Prevention’ and set up several new agencies: the Center for International Peace Operations (2002) and 
several specific interministerial working groups as well as NGO liaison committees (Dückers/Jäger 
2011). Furthermore, Germany has actively supported the establishment of the new EU agency to 
coordinate border security operations (FRONTEX) in Warsaw. It has also been one of the leading 
protagonists for setting up the International Criminal Court (ICC), which serves both a deterrent and 
pacifying function in cases of massive human rights abuses.  
At first sight, Germany’s strong support for Official Development Assistance (ODA) thus appears 
to confirm the importance of its ‘civilian power role’ tradition. Whereas the percentage share of 
economic and reconstruction aid has been somewhat lower (approx. 0.33 per cent) than for the post-
colonial powers France and the UK over the 1990s (approx. 0.40 per cent), it still tops that of the 
United States and Japan (approx. 0.25 per cent). More consistently with the multilateral tradition and 
the Europeanizing trend, Germany spends a substantial amount of aid through multilateral channels, 
especially the EU.
2
 Similarly, German ODA focuses on social infrastructure and services.
3
 However, 
when looking at the top recipients of German ODA it becomes clear that commercial interests do play 
a strong role in assurance policies.
4
 
Moreover, in the past decades Germany’s prevention policy has had a functional and geographical 
focus. Functionally, one of the most important initiatives has been a Common EU Action against 
Small Arms proliferation. At the same time, a considerable number of coalition crisis about arms 
exports to sensitive regions indicate that commercial interests also do figure prominently in crisis 
prevention policies. Geographically, Southeastern Europe has been a key region for German 
prevention efforts, but Afghanistan has also drawn much attention since 2001. In 1999, the Red-Green 
coalition launched the so-called ‘Stability Pact for Southeastern Europe’, to coordinate international 
aid and promote cooperation among former enemies. Berlin contributed 650 million Euros to the Pact 
(2000-2003) and another 240 million Euros in bilateral aid to the participating countries. In 
Afghanistan, again the Red-Green government launched a major post-conflict prevention initiative 
with the so-called Petersberg Conference, which started the political process to form a government and 
draft a constitution through a loya jirga (national assembly). Following up on the diplomatic 
engagement, Berlin spent 511 million USD of its ODA in Afghanistan (2001-2006).  
But Germany’s civilian engagement in Afghanistan has been dwarfed by its military expenditures 
by far and some of its functional prevention programs failed, such as the national training program for 
the Afghan police, so that the EU had to take over in 2007 (Kempin 2008). 
                                                     
2
 Germany has devoted an annual average of approx. 56 per cent of its multilateral ODA to the EC/EU since 1990. The 
share ranges from 42.59 percent (1990) to 83.66 percent (2005). Furthermore, Germany is the largest contributor to 
European aid funding in absolute terms. (OECD 2008a; OECD 2006: 42)  
3
 For the purpose of social infrastructure and services, Germany spent 33 percent of its overall ODA in 1993/1994, 39 
percent in 1998/1999 and 40 percent in 2003/2004 (all based on two-year averages). Although the importance of 
Economic Infrastructure and Services is slowly declining, it ranked second of the major purposes during most of the 
observed years with a share of 22 percent in 1993/1994, 19 percent in 1998/1999 and 16 percent in 2003/2004 (OECD 
2006, 91).  
4
 The major recipient of German ODA from 1990-2006 was China; Nigeria ranks third, India eighth and Indonesia tenth 
(OECD 2008b). 
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Table 3: German Expenditures in Afghanistan (military and civilian) in Bio € 
 German Expenditures in Afghanistan in billion € 
 Military Civilian  Proportion 
2002–2007  1.9 0.55 78:22 
2002–2010* 4.0 1.1 78:22 
2002–2010 including 
spending through 
EU/NATO* 
4.4 1.4 76:24 
2010 1.0 0.43 70:30 
Data: Von Krause 2010, 163. *estimates after 2009. 
Berlin has also been actively engaged in the so-called EU3+3 process in which the UNSC-5 and 
Germany use diplomatic mediation and some sanctions to persuade Iran to cease sensitive nuclear 
activities and clear up its safeguards record. The initiative itself and Germany’s involvement is 
consistent with the Europeanizing trend in prevention policies, because the E3 (UK, France and 
Germany) started the mediation in April 2003 – right after the transatlantic and European dispute on 
Iraq – to ensure that diplomacy can run its course before coercive measures are applied (Harnisch 
2007).  
The most important changes in Germany’s prevention policy have occurred, however, in regulating 
the flow of inward and outward migration (see Table 4). Right after unification, Germany featured one 
of the most liberal and permissive asylum laws because of its totalitarian past. At the same time, it also 
had one of the most restrictive citizenship laws in the European Union. Substantial changes occurred 
when a very large number of East Europeans of German descent – the so called Aussiedler and 
Übersiedler – immigrated, a period during which a very significant number of war refugees from 
former Yugoslavia also arrived (Green 2006).  
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Table 4: Migration flows, Germany 1991-2006  
Year Migration
5
 Asylum 
  Immigration Emigration Balance Total applications 
Rejected 
applications
6
 
1991         925,345          497,540     + 427,805             256,112                     128,820    
1992      1,211,348          614,956     + 596,392             438,191                     163,637    
1993         989,847          710,659     + 279,188             322,599                     347,991    
1994         777,516          629,275     + 148,241             127,210                     238,386    
1995         792,701          567,441     + 225,260             127,937                     117,939    
1996         707,954          559,064     + 148,890             116,367                     126,652    
1997         615,298          637,066     - 21,768             104,353                     101,886    
1998         605,500          638,955     - 33,455               98,644                       91,700    
1999         673,873          555,638     + 118,235               95,113                       80,231    
2000         649,249          562,794     + 86,455               78,564                       61,840    
2001         685,259          496,987     + 188,272               88,278                       55,402    
2002         658,341          505,572     + 152,769               71,124                       78,845    
2003         601,759          499,063     + 102,696               50,563                       63,002    
2004         602,182          546,965     + 55,217               35,607                       38,599    
2005         579,301          483,584     + 95,717               28,914                       27,452    
2006         558,467          483,774     + 74,693               21,029                       17,781    
Total    11,633,940       8,989,333    + 2,644,607         2,060,605                  1,740,163    
Data: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge 2007: 16, 89, 95. 
In this period, the conservative Kohl government pressed to further integrate migration policies in the 
EU to share the burden. When the effort failed and the government succeeded to limit the permissive 
constitutional asylum provision, however, Germany grew more hesitant to delegate migration policy 
competences.  
Then the Red-Green coalition tried – and first failed (2000) – to change the very restrictive German 
citizenship law, but finally succeeded in getting a watered-down version adopted (Kruse et al. 2003). 
The latest immigration law reform, passed by the Grand Coalition in 2007, adjusted to EU guidelines 
and set further restrictions by limiting subsequent immigration of dependents. In sum, when looking at 
the balance of asylum requests, the number of individuals granted asylum and the number of deported, 
Germany’s policy has become more restrictive and more europeanized.  
3.3 Protection 
Germany’s multilateral efforts to fulfil the traditional function of protecting society from external 
threats differs significantly over the issue areas, because domestic veto players domesticate the 
                                                     
5
 Migration data do not include cross-border movements by German citizens and illegal migration. Although, there are no 
reliable estimates of illegal migration flows, some indicators point to a significant increase of illegal migration during the 
early 1990s (Lederer/Nickel 1997: 35-42). 
6
 A direct comparison with total asylum applications is misleading, since not all applications are resolved in the year of 
application and time lags must be taken into consideration. 
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executive’s thrust for enhanced competences and more executive autonomy in international 
institutions. 
To begin with, Germany is a strong advocate of environmental protection measures in the 
European Union as well as in international organizations (Sprinz 2006; Jänicke 2006). The 
commitment to environmental protection is a continuous feature of German post-Cold War policy but 
became even stronger under the Schröder and Merkel governments. Notably, the recent nuclear 
accident in Fukushima (March 2011) convinced the conservative government under Chancellor 
Merkel to reverse its nuclear policy, calling for an ‘energy turnaround’, including the termination of 
all German nuclear power plants by 2022. 
Germany’s environmental protection efforts are in accordance with the firm securitization of the 
environment issue by successive governments since the 1980s and public opinion which strongly 
supports environmental engagement. Internationally, Berlin took an active role in promoting and 
framing the UN agreements from Rio de Janeiro in 1992, it fervently supported the Convention on 
Biological Diversity as well as the global climate policy resulting in the Kyoto Protocol in 1997 and 
self-confidently challenged the US resistance to a successor agreement in Bali in 2008 
(Fuller/Rosenthal 2007). Furthermore, the Merkel government made environmental issues one of their 
top priorities during the EU and G-8 presidencies in 2007 (BMU 2008; Harnisch 2009).  
The rhetoric and negotiation stance are highly supportive of environmental protection measures, 
but two flaws mark the German environment policy. Firstly, Berlin’s compliance with international 
agreements is mixed, e.g. the adoptions of the Convention on Biological Diversity as well as some 
other European agreements fell short of the ambitious rhetoric (Wurzel 2002). Secondly, since 
environmental policies are strongly europeanized, German positions are subject to finding extensive 
consensus within the EU which reduced their consistency and ambition. In sum, however, Germany’s 
contribution to international environmental protection is remarkable.  
Even more mixed are the findings in the fight against organized crime and terrorism. In the German 
security discourse, organized crime ranks low in terms of its securitization and received little public 
attention in the past. When the risk of international organized crime grew substantially with deeper 
European integration and successive reduction of border controls, Germany participated in the creation 
of Europol as European law enforcement agency and central information pool for cross-border 
criminality in 1992. The fight against organized crime has also been the subject of several bilateral 
agreements with states outside the EU recently, such as Turkey (2003) or Vietnam (2006). Annual 
reports on organized crime by the Federal Criminal Police Office indicate also that the measures taken 
are successful: the reported incidences of organized crime have declined since 2000 (BKA 2007: 7; 
BMI 2006: 455). 
The terrorist attacks in New York / Washington (2001), Madrid (2004) and London (2005) 
dramatically changed Germany’s protection trajectory. The 9/11 attacks, with three of the attackers 
living and plotting in Germany, marked a watershed in German threat perception and caused 
significant domestic and international measures to meet the challenge (Rau 2004; Lange 2006). 
Immediately after the attack, German officials expressed solidarity with the USA and willingness to 
take the necessary steps. The parliament approved two substantial anti-terror packages which aimed at 
strengthening air and border security as well as reducing limitations on terrorist prosecution. Public 
opinion shifted significantly towards more robust measures, but a majority favours domestic measures, 
such as poverty reduction, over increased defence spending (Bulmahn 2008: 35). The second package 
also significantly improved the communication between federal and state levels as well as between 
intelligence and enforcement agencies. In 2004 the ‘Gemeinsame Terrorabwehrzentrum’ was 
established, which coordinates various enforcement agencies, thereby breaking with Germany’s long-
held principle of a separation of police and intelligence services (Knelangen 2011). Additionally, the 
terrorist threat fostered personnel growth in the federal law enforcement agencies, Federal Crime 
Agency and Federal Police, which had already been underway since the early 1990s (Möllers/van 
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Ooyen 2008). The 9/11 attacks also boosted German participation in international cooperation on 
criminal and security issues. Accordingly, Berlin drives EU efforts to prosecute international terrorists 
and dry up their international financial flows. The US and Germany established close bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation to fight terrorism more effectively, e.g. through intelligence sharing.  
However, cooperation with the United States faces major obstacles, because of institutional limits 
and societal concerns about US violations of Germany’s tough personal data protection laws 
(Miko/Froehlich 2004). In 2013, information by Ex-NSA employee Edward Snowden about American 
and British spying schemes in Germany brought these concerns again in sharp relief, so that domestic 
resistance vis-à-vis executive autonomy-seeking in protection policies remains considerable 
(Kietz/Timm 2013).  
Cases in point are the failed attempt of the federal government to enact a law allowing for the 
forceful downing of hijacked airplanes as well as the intense debate on phone and internet tapping. 
Hence, the domestication of the executive’s security policies results in conflicts over Germany’s full-
fledged participation in international anti-terrorism cooperation. This trend continued under the Grand 
Coalition, although the Merkel government held a two-third majority in the Bundestag (Harnisch 
2009). 
In sum, German contributions to protective policies are mixed. While the commitment to 
environmental issues puts Berlin in a leading role internationally, policies on terrorism and biological 
attacks clearly display an ambivalent pattern between domestic constraints and allied expectations. 
3.4 Compellence 
Most pundits suggest that increasing participation in ever more robust military operations since 
unification proves that Germany has become a normal country. Moreover, some even suggest that 
Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who opposed the US intervention in Iraq, deliberately sought to 
demystify the military during his tenure (Baumann/Hellmann 2001; Geis 2005; Hellmann 2004; 
Wagener 2006).  
But there is little evidence that Germany’s discourse formations (ideational structure) or 
parliamentary system (institutional structure) have supported or will support power politics in terms of 
autonomy-seeking or influence-maximising behaviour (Harnisch 2005, 2009; Overhaus 2007; Meiers 
2007). Since unification, the Bundeswehr has been deployed in some fifteen countries and 
deployments have regularly addressed humanitarian crises and/or clear breaches of international law 
rather than strategic interests in resources or to counterbalance upcoming competitors, e.g. Russia. 
Germany’s deployments have thus often been motivated by civilian power norms – as problematic as 
these may be – and constrained by institutional factors.  
Indeed, when analyzing the patterns of deployment, the findings suggest that while Bundeswehr 
missions have become ever more robust over time the contingents also remained multilaterally 
embedded. Domestically, the Bundestag has strengthened its mandating power – through the 
Parlamentsbeteiligungsgesetz (2005) – and attached an increasing number of operational and financial 
caveats (Wiefelspütz 2008; Harnisch 2009). One might argue that some deployments (and non-
deployments such in the Libyan case) have been driven by more mundane ‘national interests’, such as 
limiting the flow of refugees from Kosovo or signalling cooperation to the US after the Iraq dispute 
through sending (additional) troops to Afghanistan. But several in-depth studies of Germany’s 
domestic deployment debates clearly indicate that mandates reaped large parliamentarian support 
because of their close fit with the civilian power tradition and drew substantial opposition when these 
where in doubt (Meiers 2007: 636; Harnisch 2011). In sum, German force projection patterns broadly 
followed an international trend towards more and more dangerous contingencies during the 1990s, but 
domestic legitimization and deployment patterns do not support the realist’s argument.  
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Table 5: German contribution to EU-led compellence missions 2003-2007
7
 
Mission 
German Contribution by year 
(Number / % of mission total) 
Aver. 
year- 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Span 
EU Concordia 
(Macedonia) 
26 
(7.65%) 
     
EU Artemis 
(DR Congo) 
N/A      
EUFOR Althea 
(Bosnia & Herzegovina) 
 
1227 
(21.1%) 
1014 
(17.9%) 
861 
(16.2%) 
235 
(10.9%) 
16.5% 
EUFOR  
(DR Congo) 
   
745 
(33%) 
  
Data: SIPRI Database 2004-2007, Council of the EU 2008 
Explanations stressing institutional constraints and ideational parameters enjoy more success, 
especially when explaining the idiosyncrasies of the German compellence policies. Thus, the Grand 
Coalition has repeatedly withstood allies’ calls for an increase in defence expenditures. Instead, 
Germany’s military budgets are steadily declining since 1990 and thus capping the Bundeswehr’s 
capacity to transform into an intervention force with additional assets in long-distance deployment, 
armoured vehicles etc. Although defence budgets of most Western European states dropped after the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union, German spending is remarkably lower than the budgets of France or 
Britain. While it may be argued that the gap in expenditure is caused solely by additional burdens for 
states with nuclear arsenals, it seems more plausible that this gap reveals a continuous German 
reluctance to robust military means based on its distinct security culture. The impact of security 
culture is furthermore evident in the government’s long-held commitment to the Bundeswehr as a 
conscription army which was only recently overturned by a policy deliberation process in which 
strategic concerns of status, expanded force projection capabilities and relative institutional influence 
were markedly absent (Harnisch/Weiß 2014).  
Table 6: German defence expenditure (NATO 2007b)  
 1990-94 1995-99 2000-04 2005 2006 2007 
Share of GDP 2.1 1.6 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 
Rate of change  
in defence spending 
-7.2 -0.7 -0.8 -0.6 -1.0 -0.6 
Distribution of  
defence expenditure: 
      
personnel 57.4% 61.5% 60.0% 58.3% 57.1% 56.6% 
equipment 13.5% 11.8% 14.0% 14.2% 15.0% 15.3% 
infrastructure 4.9% 4.8% 4.3% 3.7% 3.6% 3.7% 
other 23.9% 21.9% 21.7% 23.9% 24.3% 24.3% 
Defence spending  
per capita
8
 
609 344 343 325 322 320 
Source: Data provided by NRC nations compiled by Data Analysis Section, Force Planning Directorate,  
Defence Policy and Planning Division, NATO International Staff 2007 
                                                     
7
 The table does not include the bridging mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA from 2008 to 2009, which included four German 
personnel (Council of the EU 2008). 
8
 In USD (2000 prices and exchange rates). 
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In sum, Germany’s armed forces remain, in comparison with other leading NATO/EU nations, much 
less deployable, projectable and sustainable. Accordingly, for compellence the country will be 
dependent upon multilateral NATO- and EU-led compellence missions under UN Security Council 
mandates.  
4. Germany, emerging powers’ statecraft and regional security governance  
There has been considerable debate in German think tanks whether Germany’s approach to new 
emerging powers in world politics was adequate and whether Germany itself was ‘an emerging power’ 
ready to take over leadership roles, e.g. as permament member of the UN Security Council (Schirm 
2007; Destradi 2010; Flemes 2010). Opinions vary widely, however, who really is an emerging power 
and for what purpose their growing capacities should be used. While the academic debate is ongoing 
and hard to resolve, it appears that the federal government, led by the Foreign and Development 
Ministry, has come to recognize the importance of some regional powers as a new category of partner 
nations, in addition to Germany’s traditional special relationships with the state of Israel, Poland, 
Russia, France, and the United States. 
The lack of a common understanding is no accident. Depending on the ministries and regions 
involved differing concepts and goals for cooperating with emerging powers can be identified (Table 
7). Starting in 2004, the para-official German Development Institute drew up a list of some 15 
countries of major economic and regional importance which may (or may not yet) have been regarded 
as regional leaders at the time and which should figure, as so-called ‘anchor states’, in German foreign 
policy to promote regional integration and global public goods (Stamm 2004). Then in 2006, several 
think tanks began to address the role of ‘regional powers and/or emerging middle powers’ in world 
politics against the background of the German G-8 presidency and the transatlantic academic debate 
on ‘pivotal states’ and ‘rising powers’ (Nolte 2006; Nabers/Godehardt 2011).  
During its G-8 presidency the Federal government, launched the G-8+5 format to facilitate further 
integration of the PR China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa into global economic governance. 
Building upon its G-7 presidency in 1999, when the German government initiated the G-20 meeting of 
finance ministers and central bank presidents, the planning phase for the Heiligendamm Summit 
meeting appears to have been the seedbed for subsequent policy initiatives to foster global security 
governance through cooperation with selected regional powers. Then in 2011, the Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) identified several emerging powers as ‘global 
developing partners’ which were expected to be able to cooperate on issues such as climate change, 
peace and security and global poverty (BMZ 2011).  
In February 2012, the Federal government, coordinated by the Foreign Ministry, launched its 
concept for a new division of global responsibilities, which introduced the term ‘Gestaltungsmächte’ 
or ‘creative powers’ (Bundesregierung 2012). 
Sebastian Harnisch 
12 
Table 7: German concepts of regional, emerging and middle powers 
Agency/actor  Concept Countries Characteristics 
German Development 
Institute (Stamm 2004) 
Anchor countries PR China; Egypt, 
Argentine, Iran, Brazil, 
India, Saudi-Arabia, 
Mexico, Indonesia, 
Nigeria, Russia, Pakistan, 
South Africa, Thailand, 
Turkey 
Economic importance, 
leadership potential 
German Institute for 
Global and Area 
Studies (Nolte 2006) 
Regional powers, 
emerging middle 
powers 
  
Federal Ministry for 
Economic Cooperation 
and Development 
(BMZ 2011) 
Global 
Development 
Partners 
Brazil, India, Indonesia, 
Mexico, South Africa. 
 
state craft, importance 
for MDG/ GPG 
production, economic 
importance, relevance 
for reg. integration 
Federal 
Government/Federal 
Foreign Office 
(Bundesregierung 
2012) 
Creative powers Non-partner countries of 
EU/NATO/G-8 
Regional/global 
economic importance, 
strong global political 
vision; regional/globale 
importance for 
GPG/regional 
integration 
Federal Ministry of 
Economics and 
Technology (BMWi 
2012) 
New Target 
Markets 
BRICS, Columbia, 
Mexico, Nigeria, 
Indonesia, Vietnam and 
Malaysia 
Trade Promotion for 
development and/or 
energy security 
Federal Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture, and 
Consumer Protection 
(BMELV 2013) 
Bilateral 
Cooperation with 
foreign countries 
Brazil, China, Russia, 
Kazakhstan, Turkey, 
Vietnam 
Cooperative food 
security global 
consumer protection 
Data: Official websites of German Federal government/ministries 
The concept rests on several, ultimately debatable, assumptions: First, the emergence of several potent 
economies will proceed unbroken, and which will translate into political power and will be thenused 
for shared common regional and global goals. Second, emerging ‘creative powers’ can be steered and 
socialized into supportive members of the existing international order by engaging them in cooperative 
schemes, such as triangular partnerships with developing countries. Third, bureaucratic interests 
within German ministries and agencies can be overcome (through central coordination by the Foreign 
Ministry, an electronic dialogue system and country specific interministerial working groups) to 
prepare for extensive bi- and plurilateral inter-governmental formats (Bagger/Heynitz 2012: 56). 
In reality, the ‘creative power concept’ has figured more as an umbrella for several (more or less 
focussed) international cooperation initiatives than as a streamlining instrument. Several distinct 
ministerial approaches coexist within the 2012 interministerial concept paper framework: First, the 
BMZ global development partnership which, e.g. now also encloses the PRC after Germany ceded its 
official development aid in China (2011). Second, the Ministry of Economics launched an initiative 
‘new target markets’ in 2012 which encloses the BRICS, Columbia, Mexico, Nigeria, Indonesia, 
Vietnam and Malaysia. Third, the Ministry for the Environment has been cooperating with several 
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‘creative powers’ under the framework of the ‘International Climate Initiative’ (ICI) since 2008. 
During this period it has spent some 800 Mio Euros for the ICI, sponsoring projects on sustainable 
economic growth, climate change adaptation measures, expansion of natural sinks, and biological 
diversity. The ten top recipient countries include the BRICS, Indonesia, Mexico, Peru, Turkey and 
Ukraine (BMU 2013).  
Moreover, the Merkel government has come under sustained domestic criticism for being vague 
about the scope of the concept and the group of countries electable. The critique goes back to a speech 
the Chancellor herself held in October 2012. Addressing the Armed Forces Academy for 
Communication and Information, she suggested: 
“Those who feel responsible for peacekeeping, but who are not capable of providing active 
support everywhere, are called upon to support trustful partners who then are enabled to do the 
job.” (Merkel 2012) 
While the passage has been dubbed the ‘Merkel doctrine’ subsequently, the Chancellor, in the same 
speech, stressed that this would not implicate any watering down of Germany’s strict standards for 
arms exports (Ibid.). The oppositional Social Democratic party and several security policy experts 
have questioned the government’s recent decision of arms exports to Saudi-Arabia as well as 
cooperation with Qatar, two members of the ‘Gulf Cooperation Council’ (GCC) believed to have 
supported militant jihadist groups for decades, most recently in the Syrian civil war (Heumann 2013). 
5. Conclusion 
Germany’s role changes over the past two decades suggest several important lessons for its future 
trajectory. First, while Germany’s military deployment has increased in kind and number, the 
respective goals reflect the broad international trend towards establishing certain, if fragile, 
international humanitarian standards. Few indications exist that current or future deployments serve 
broad and/or national influence seeking schemes. Despite abandoning the draft, Germany’s deployable 
forces, both in kind and number, remain moderate. After more than a decade of deployments in 
Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan, German society has become increasingly sceptical about the 
effectiveness of military forces beyond stopping ongoing warfare. Second, on its own, Germany’s 
non-military support for regional and global security governance is substantial but insufficient to make 
a major difference in most cases. While laudable in some respects, e.g. the E3 mediation in the Iranian 
nuclear conflict, German efforts alone or in minilateral frameworks rarely shift the balance of political 
power among or within the cooperating states and societies. Accordingly, all German governments 
have used traditional security institutions, the EU, NATO and UN as force multipliers when applying 
military, economic or soft power. Recently, the Merkel government has embraced the concept of 
‘creative powers’, trying to engage regional major players to cooperate in implementing shared goals. 
For its proponents, it will allow Germany to effectuate a group of states in support of the international 
order Germany prefers. For its critics cooperating ‘creative powers’ will socialize Germany as much 
as the latter socializes them. Third, a broad political majority among Germany’s political parties still 
supports substantial contributions to both regional and global security governance, but this may not be 
sufficient. A central problem of Germany’s willingness to facilitate collective action is that it is 
matched by domestic institutions, which moderate forceful or even sustained international leadership, 
at least in the medium and long-term. Parliamentary control and judicial review of executive action 
has become a constant domesticating factor, which have been multiplied by societal scepticism and 
financial constraints during the Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent Euro-crisis. In turn, 
Germany’s reluctance to take a leading role in shouldering collective burdens, most dramatically so in 
the Euro-crisis, has made some of Germany’s older partners reluctant to take up complimentary roles. 
Such reluctance, as in the case of the Obama government’s decision to back up but not to lead 
European action in Libya, are increasingly hampering traditional regional as well as global security 
governance patterns.  
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This suggests that, although painful, further changes in Germany’s international role must be part 
of a broader rearrangement of international security policy role taking and making. While not 
sufficient for successful security governance production, Germany’s engagement is still essential and 
should be accorded higher priority than it receives now in the German political establishment. 
Germany’s Post World war II foreign policy has historically been one of the former’s most successful 
public policies. By diffusing power domestically but toughening international institutions up, 
Germany has sustained the international order, which it needs to prosper.  
*** 
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